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The defining feature of consequentialism is that it ranks outcomes (e.g., those 
associated with performing certain acts, complying with certain codes of rules, or 
inculcating certain sets of motives) and then takes the normative statuses of actions 
to be some increasing function of how those outcomes rank. Little else can be said 
unequivocally about consequentialism, as consequentialists disagree about most 
everything else. Consequentialists disagree on whether we should assess the 
normative statuses of actions directly in terms of how their outcomes rank (act-
consequentialism) or indirectly in terms of whether, say, they comply with the code 
of rules with the highest-ranked associated outcome (rule-consequentialism). They 
disagree on whether the relevant function is a maximizing one (maximizing 
consequentialism) or a satisficing one (satisficing consequentialism). And they 
disagree on whether there is just one ranking of outcomes that is the same for all 
agents (agent-neutral consequentialism) or a potentially different ranking for each 
agent (agent-relative consequentialism). 
As most see it, consequentialism is a theory about the permissibility of  
actions, but some hold instead that it is a theory about only the comparative moral 
value of actions (scalar consequentialism). And whereas some hold that 
consequentialism is committed to ranking outcomes in terms of their impersonal 
value, others deny this. Even those who agree that outcomes are to be ranked in 
terms of their impersonal value disagree about whether outcomes are to be ranked 
in terms of their actual value (objective consequentialism) or their expected value 
(subjective consequentialism). 
Given all this disagreement, there can be no illuminating set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions that captures all the various uses of the term 
‘consequentialism’. Instead, as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2003) points out, “the 
term ‘consequentialism’ seems to be used as a family resemblance term to refer to any 
descendant of classic utilitarianism that remains close enough to its ancestor in the 
important respects.” And since philosophers disagree on which are the important 
respects, there is no agreement on how to define ‘consequentialism’. But even if there 
is no agreement on how to define ‘consequentialism’, there is, as Sinnott-Armstrong 
suggests, an archetype: viz., maximizing act-utilitarianism. In this essay, I will start 
with this archetype, abstract from it the most traditional version of 
consequentialism, and then explain how various objections to this traditional 
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version have led philosophers to adopt more nuanced versions of 
consequentialism. 
 
Maximizing Act-Utilitarianism and Traditional Act-Consequentialism 
 
Maximizing act-utilitarianism is a species of traditional act-consequentialism, which 
holds: 
 
TAC: (1.0) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and 
ultimately because, there is no available alternative, y, whose outcome 
ranks higher than x’s outcome, and (2.0) y’s outcome ranks higher than 
x’s outcome if and only if y’s outcome is impersonally better than x’s 
outcome. 
 
Or, more simply put, TAC holds: 
 
A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and 
ultimately because, their doing so would maximize the impersonal 
good. 
 
Two aspects of TAC need clarification. First, note that a subject’s 
performing x would maximize the impersonal good (hereafter, simply ‘the 
good’) if and only if there is no available alternative act whose outcome is better 
than x’s outcome. For one, this means that there can be more than one act that 
would maximize the good, as there can be more than one act that is tied for first 
place in terms of the production of the good. For another, this means that TAC is 
not committed to there being a complete ranking of outcomes. Indeed, it may be 
that some outcomes are incommensurable with others such that they are not better 
than, worse than, or just as good as the others. Thus, on TAC, an act can be 
permissible even though there are available alternatives whose outcomes are 
incommensurable with its outcome. So long as there is no available alternative 
whose outcome is better than its outcome, it will be permissible. 
Second, note that, by including the words “and ultimately because,” 
I am acknowledging that someone could fail to be a traditional act-
consequentialist (a TACist) even though she accepts the following bi-conditional. 
 
BC: A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if their doing 
so would maximize the good. 
 
Take, for instance, a divine command theorist who accepts not only that a 
subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and ultimately 
because, their doing so is not forbidden by God, but also that their performing x is 
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forbidden by God if and only if their doing so would fail to maximize the good. 
This divine command theorist would accept BC, but she would not, I presume, 
count as a TACist, for she would deny that, when acts are permissible, they are so 
ultimately because they maximize the good. To deny this is to deny TAC. 
Now, maximizing act-utilitarianism is a species of TAC, for it is 
committed to both TAC and the following further claim about what is good. That 
is, maximizing act-utilitarianism is committed to the following two claims. 
 
MAU (i) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, 
and ultimately because, their doing so would maximize the good, and (ii) 
their performing x would maximize the good if and only if their doing so 
would maximize aggregate utility. 
 
The aggregate utility that would be produced by an act is the sum of all the 
utility it would produce minus the sum of all the disutility that it would produce, 
where utility is a measure of whatever it is that enhances a subject’s welfare, and 
disutility is a measure of whatever it is that diminishes a subject’s welfare. The 
classical utilitarians (e.g., Mill 1861 and Bentham 1789) held that pleasure is the only 
thing that contributes to a subject’s welfare and that pain is the only thing that 
detracts from a subject’s welfare. This view about welfare is known as hedonism. 
Hence, the view according to which both hedonism and maximizing act-
utilitarianism are true is known as hedonistic act-utilitarianism (HAU). HAU is 
perhaps the simplest version of TAC. For this reason, I will often use it to illustrate 
some of the putative problems with TAC. 
 
Objections to Traditional Act-Consequentialism 
 
TAC amounts to essentially three claims: (I) it is never permissible to fail to 
maximize the good, (II) it is always permissible to maximize the good, and (III) if a 
subject’s performing x is morally permissible, it is ultimately because their doing 
so would maximize the good. Given these three claims, there are at least three 
general sorts of objections to TAC, each corresponding to the rejection of one of 
these three. I consider them below. 
 
First objection: It is sometimes permissible to fail 
to maximize the good. 
 
Agent-Sacrificing Options and the Self-Other Asymmetry: 
 
According to TAC, maximizing the good is always obligatory. According to 
commonsense morality, by contrast, it is often optional. On commonsense 
morality, there is often the moral option either to act to make things better overall 
 4 
but worse for oneself (or others) or to act to make things better for oneself (or 
others) but worse overall. These options, which are known as agent-centered options, 
provide agents with the freedom to give their own interests more or less weight 
than they have from the impersonal perspective. They come in two varieties: agent-
sacrificing options and agent-favoring options.  
Agent-sacrificing options permit agents to perform suboptimal acts so 
long as these acts are suboptimal only because they involve producing less good 
for the agent. The underlying thought is that agents are permitted to make things 
worse for themselves so long as they do not thereby make things worse for others 
overall.1 To illustrate, suppose that Abe is stranded on a deserted island. Given 
his isolation, what Abe does will affect only himself. Now, suppose that he is 
presently sitting next to an ant hill and that the ants are starting to bite him. 
Assume that letting the ants continue to bite him is not what is best for him. 
What would be best for him is his getting up and collecting coconuts. Of course, 
since he is the only one affected by his actions, his getting up and collecting 
coconuts is not only what is best for him but also what is best overall. So, on a 
traditional act-consequentialist theory such as HAU, it is wrong for Abe to let the 
ants continue to bite him. 
This may seem counterintuitive. Although it is clearly stupid, foolish, and 
irrational for Abe to let the ants continue to bite him, there does not seem to be 
anything immoral about his doing so. After all, in doing so, he does not hurt 
anyone but himself. Of course, it might, in certain circumstances, be immoral for 
Abe to let the ants bite someone else, but that is someone else. On commonsense 
morality, there seems to be an asymmetry between the self and others. Whereas 
there is a pro tanto obligation to ensure that others enjoy pleasure and avoid pain, 
there is no such obligation with regard to ourselves. 
Given this asymmetry, which is known as the self-other asymmetry, we 
often have the option of sacrificing our own greater utility for sake of promoting 
others’ lesser utility. I can, for instance, permissibly give you my last two aspirins 
to relieve your slightly less severe headache even if that entails my forgoing the 
opportunity to relieve my slightly more severe headache. But a traditional act-
consequentialist theory, such as HAU, entails that it would be wrong for me to 
do so. For if my taking the aspirins is what would maximize aggregate utility, 
then that is what I’m required to do. On HAU, by contrast, there is no self-other 
asymmetry; there is just as much of an obligation to promote one’s own utility as 
to promote anyone else’s. Thus, HAU seems objectionable in that it is unable to 
accommodate agent-sacrificing options and the self-other asymmetry. 
To meet this objection, some have proposed revising HAU. Ted Sider (1993), 
for instance, has proposed that we instead adopt self-other utilitarianism: 
 
SOU (1.0) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, 
and ultimately because, there is no available alternative, y, whose outcome 
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ranks higher than x’s outcome, and (2.1) y’s outcome ranks higher than x’s 
outcome if and only if both (a) y’s outcome contains more utility for others 
(i.e., those other than the given subject) than x’s outcome and (b) y’s 
outcome contains more overall utility than x’s outcome. 
 
In other words, SOU holds that an act is morally permissible so long as there is no 
available alternative that produces both more utility for others and more overall 
utility. SOU thereby allows agents to give their own utility anywhere from no 
weight at all to the same weight that everyone else’s utility has from the 
impersonal perspective. 
SOU accounts for both agent-sacrificing options and the self-other 
asymmetry. For instance, it accounts for our intuition that Abe does no wrong in 
allowing the ants to bite him given that there is no available alternative whose 
outcome contains more utility for others. And SOU accounts for our intuition that it 
would be permissible for me to give my last two aspirins to someone else so that 
they can relieve their less severe headache. This is permissible, because there is no 
available alternative whose outcome contains both more overall utility and more 
utility for others. There is only an available alternative whose outcome contains 
more overall utility: the one in which I take the aspirins. But this alternative 




Although SOU accounts for both agent-sacrificing options and the self-other 
asymmetry, it fails to account for agent-favoring options. Agent-favoring options 
permit agents to favor their own interests and, thus, to promote their own utility 
even when doing so entails doing less to promote the impersonal good. SOU’s 
failure to accommodate agent-favoring options gives rise to what is known as the 
demandingness objection. Theories such as TAC, HAU, and SOU are too demanding 
in that they imply that agents are morally required to sacrifice their projects, 
interests, and special relationships whenever doing so would maximize the good. 
According to both HAU and SOU, I am morally required to sacrifice my interest in 
living in material comfort, to neglect my relationship with my daughter, and to 
abandon my project of writing a book if I could thereby produce more aggregate 
utility. Suppose, for instance, that what would maximize utility is my taking all my 
money and moving to some poor developing nation in Africa, founding a school 
for the education and empowerment of young women. Assume that this is, of all 
my options, the one that would produce the most utility. Yet, to perform this option, 
I must give up living in material comfort, abandon my project of writing a book, 
and desert my daughter, leaving her to become a ward of the state. Theories such 
as HAU and SOU imply that I am required to make such sacrifices for the sake of 
maximizing utility. But many philosophers (such as: Stroud 1998, Hurley 2006, and 
Portmore 2011) think that this is to demand more from me than can be reasonably 
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demanded of me. 
Proponents of utilitarianism might try to respond to this objection by 
arguing that the problem lies not with HAU (or SOU), but with the sorry state of 
the world that we live in. That is, they might argue that it is only because we live 
in a world in which there is so much suffering and hardship that agents like myself 
are required to make such tremendous sacrifices. But, in fact, this is false. For 
theories such as HAU and SOU are too demanding even in utopian worlds. To 
illustrate, imagine that we live in a utopian world in which everyone leads very 
happy and fulfilled lives. And imagine that my blood contains the makings of 
some new drug that would make everyone but myself slightly happier. Suppose, 
though, that to synthesize this drug I would need to sacrifice my life so that 
scientists could drain out all my blood. Assume that they need all my blood at 
once to synthesize the drug. And imagine, for the moment, that we can 
accurately quantify the resultant changes in people’s utilities in terms of utiles—a 
measurement of utility equivalent to the utility of a person’s experiencing the 
mildest of pleasures for the briefest of moments. Assume that if this drug were 
synthesized and evenly distributed among the remaining population of eight 
billion and one people, each person would get an additional utile. And assume 
that in laying down my life I would thereby be sacrificing exactly eight billion 
utiles.  
In this case, I could provide a net gain of one utile of aggregate utility by 
sacrificing my life. And so, on HAU and SOU, I am morally required to do so. But to 
demand that I make such a tremendous sacrifice for the sake of such a miniscule gain 
in the total aggregate utility (i.e., one utile) is, it seems, to demand more from me than 
can be reasonably demanded of me. For it seems that I have at least as much reason, all 
things considered, to refrain from sacrificing my life in this instance. Perhaps, I have 
some reason to sacrifice my life for the sake of producing one extra utile of utility, but 
given that a utile is a rather small measure of utility this will not be a very strong 
reason. Moreover, it seems that I have a strong agent-relative reason to safeguard my 
own utility by refusing to sacrifice my life. This reason is an agent-relative reason in 
that it is a reason that is specific to me, and it goes beyond the agent-neutral reason 
we each have to promote the total aggregate utility. The thought, then, is that 
although we each have an agent-neutral moral reason to promote the total aggregate 
utility, we also each have an additional agent-relative nonmoral reason to promote our 
own utility. And, given this additional reason, we sometimes have sufficient reason, 
all things considered, to do something that will promote our own utility at the expense 
of failing to maximize the total aggregate utility. Indeed, many utilitarians (e.g., 
Singer 1999, Sidgwick 1907) concede as much. 
At this point, such utilitarians argue that although utilitarian views such 
as HAU and SOU demand that we sacrifice more than we have decisive reason, all 
things considered, to sacrifice, this is no objection to their view. For they claim 
that it is just a fact about morality that it demands more from us than we have 
decisive reason, all things considered, to give. And, so, it is no objection to these 
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views that they exhibit the unreasonable demandingness that is inherent in 
morality itself. As David Sobel puts it, “What morality asks, we could say, is too 
much to be the thing the agent has most reason to do all things considered, but 
not too much to count as what morality asks” (2007, 14). 
Critics of utilitarianism argue, though, that in salvaging utilitarianism 
from the demandingness objection by claiming that moral requirements are not 
necessarily anything that we have decisive reason, all things considered, to obey, 
the utilitarian wins this battle only to lose the war. That is, they succeed in 
defending the high bar that they set for what morality demands of us only by 
lowering the bar for what reason demands of us by way of our compliance with 
morality, thereby implausibly marginalizing the role that morality plays in our 
practical reason and deliberation (Hurley 2006, 705). And other critics argue that 
this type of defense is wholly misguided, for morality is, by necessity, supreme in 
its rational authority (Portmore 2011). 
There is, however, another way of responding to the demandingness 
objection. We could revise SOU so that it accommodates agent-favoring options. We 
can do so by adopting Schefflerian utilitarianism: 
 
SU (1.0) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and 
ultimately because, there is no available alternative, y, whose outcome 
ranks higher than x’s outcome, and (2.2) y’s outcome ranks higher than x’s 
outcome if and only if both (a) y’s outcome contains more utility for others 
(i.e., those other than the given subject) than x’s outcome and (b*) y’s 
outcome contains more egoistically-adjusted utility than x’s outcome, 
where egoistically-adjusted utility includes everyone’s utility but adjusts 
the overall total by giving the subject’s utility, say, ten times the weight of 
anyone else’s. 
 
In other words, SU holds that an act is morally permissible so long as there is no 
available alternative that produces both more utility for others and more 
egoistically-adjusted utility. SU thereby allows agents to give their own utility 
anywhere from no weight at all to ten times the weight that their utility has from 
the impersonal perspective. 
Since SU allows agents to give their own utility less weight than it has 
from an impersonal perspective, SU accommodates agent-sacrificing options just as 
SOU does. But, unlike SOU, SU can also accommodate agent-favoring options and, 
as we will see below, supererogatory acts as well. To illustrate, consider the case of 
Edouard, who has the following four mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
alternatives: a1, a2, a3, and a4. (To ensure that they are jointly exhaustive, let a1 be the 
act of performing something other than a2, a3, or a4.) The consequences of each of 









Let S = the subject, Us(x) = the utility that would accrue to the subject if 
they were to perform x, let U–s(x) = the utility that would accrue to 
others if the subject were to perform x, let U+s(x) = U-s(x) + [10 × Us(x)], 
and let U(x) = the overall utility that would be produced if S were to 
perform x. 
x Us(x) U–s(x) U(x) U+s(x) deontic status 
a1 7 10 17 80 merely permissible 
a2 2 4 6 24 impermissible 
a3 1 15 16 25 supererogatory3 
a4 –1 20 19 10 supererogatory 
 
Whereas Edouard is, on HAU, obligated to perform a4, he is, on SU, 
permitted to perform a1 instead, which is better for him. Thus, SU permits him to 
perform a1 even though his performing a4 would be both better for others and 
better in terms of the impersonal good. Edouard has, then, the agent-favoring 
option of performing a1 as opposed to a4. Furthermore, SU accommodates agent-
sacrificing options. For Edouard can permissibly choose to perform a3 as opposed 
to a1, thereby providing others with a net benefit of five utiles at a cost of six 




Interestingly, SU can also accommodate supererogatory acts, acts that go above 
and beyond the call of duty. This is a plus, as HAU is usually thought to be 
unable to accommodate supererogatory acts or, at least, unable to accommodate 
the range of acts that we take to be supererogatory. 
An act is supererogatory if and only if it meets the following three 
conditions: (i) it is morally optional, (ii) it is morally commendatory, and (iii) it 
goes beyond the call of duty.4 Clearly, HAU can meet the first two conditions. 
Some acts will be morally optional on HAU, for sometimes there will be more 
than one available alternative that would maximize utility. And some of these 
morally optional alternatives will be morally commendatory. Suppose, for 
instance, that Smith has the choice of benefiting himself or Jones and that either 
way utility will be maximized. If Smith chooses to benefit Jones as opposed to 
himself, this certainly seems to be morally commendatory. Moreover, it is morally 
optional since it is one of two acts that would maximize utility. So, here is an act 
that meets the first two conditions for being supererogatory. 
What about the third? Does it go beyond the call of duty? Some argue 
that it does (Harwood 2003, Vessel 2010). They argue that an agent goes beyond 
the call of duty so long as she does more for others than she is required to do. But 
we might wonder whether this correctly specifies the relevant sense of ‘going 
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beyond the call of duty’. If we hold that going beyond the call of duty amounts 
only to doing more for others than is required, then we must deny the possibility 
of supererogation with respect to self-regarding duties. Yet it certainly seems 
possible to go beyond what such duties require (Kawall 2003, Portmore 2008). 
For instance, we might think that there is a duty to develop our talents and that 
this is an imperfect duty that doesn’t require that we take advantage of every 
opportunity to develop our talents, but requires only that we take advantage of a 
sufficient number of such opportunities. But if this is right, then it is surely 
possible to go above and beyond our duty to develop our talents, and yet doing so 
may be of no benefit to anyone besides ourselves. 
Consider also that a supererogatory act must involve doing more of 
whatever there is more moral reason to do. After all, we would not think that 
perspiring more than is required is supererogatory, because we do not think that 
there is any moral reason to perspire more than is required. So, we should think that 
doing more for others than is required is supererogatory only if there is more moral 
reason to do more for others than is required. Yet, on HAU, Carlos has no more moral 
reason to enhance Sergio’s utility by some amount than to enhance his own utility by 
that same amount. All that matters on HAU is that utility is maximized, and utility 
would be maximized either way. 
Even if we allow that an agent goes beyond the call of duty so long as they 
do more for others than is required and, thus, allow that HAU can accommodate 
certain supererogatory acts, such as Carlos’s choosing to benefit Sergio rather than 
himself, HAU still cannot accommodate the range of acts that we take to be 
supererogatory. On HAU, no optimific act could ever be supererogatory.5 Yet, 
intuitively, many such acts are supererogatory. For instance, Edouard’s 
performing a4 seems supererogatory. Yet HAU implies that it is obligatory. To 
illustrate, suppose that Edouard has exactly $3,000 in disposable income each 
month and, thus, that he can reasonably afford to perform a1, which involves 
giving $1,000 a month to charity. By contrast, his performing a4 involves his giving 
$3,000 a month to charity, thereby sacrificing everything beyond what is needed for 
his continued subsistence. Now, his making such a sacrifice would, we will 
suppose, be optimific in that his donating all of his disposable income to charity 
would do more good than his spending any of it on himself. Even so, on 
commonsense morality, this level of sacrifice would be considered supererogatory, 
not obligatory, as HAU implies. 
Worse yet, HAU implies that many intuitively supererogatory acts are 
actually morally wrong (McConnell 1980). Suppose, for instance, that Carlos has 
just been given the last piece of cherry pie. Since, unlike Sergio, cherry pie is 
Carlos’s favorite, Carlos would enjoy eating the last piece of pie more than Sergio 
would. Suppose, then, that Carlos must choose between giving Sergio the last piece 
of pie, thereby enhancing Sergio’s utility by five utiles, or keeping the last piece for 
himself, thereby enhancing his own utility by six utiles. In this case, HAU implies 
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that it would be wrong for Carlos to choose to benefit Sergio instead of himself. 
Yet, arguably, his giving Sergio the last piece of pie is supererogatory. To avoid such 
counterintuitive implications and to accommodate a wider range of supererogatory 
acts, the act-consequentialist must adopt a view such as SU instead. 
So, as we’ve seen above, one general sort of objection to TAC is that it 
implausibly holds that it is never permissible to fail to maximize the good. We 
just considered two instances of this objection: (i) that it is permissible to fail to 
maximize the good when doing so will make only oneself worse off and (ii) that it 
is permissible to fail to maximize the good when the alternative would be 
unreasonably demanding. In the next section, we’ll consider a third instance of 
this general objection: (iii) that it is permissible to fail to maximize the good when 
one doesn’t know what would maximize the good. 
 
Traditional Act-Consequentialism and Not Knowing 
What Will Maximize the Good: 
 
We rarely know what will maximize the good. Although it is sometimes possible 
to anticipate the immediate effects of our actions, it is clearly impossible to 
anticipate all the effects that our actions will have over an indefinite future. And 
these unforeseen future effects may be truly massive, affecting, perhaps, the 
identities of people over countless generations (Lenman 2000). Such massive 
unforeseen effects would likely dwarf whatever immediate effects we do foresee. 
The upshot of all this is that we are literally clueless as to which of our actions 
would maximize the good (Lenman 2000). And, given our cluelessness, TAC can 
be of no practical use in deciding what to do. 
At this point, the TACist can point out that this is really no objection to 
the theory, for TAC provides only a criterion of rightness and not a decision-making 
procedure (Bales 1971). Whereas a decision-making procedure must be something 
that actual agents with limited knowledge and imperfect calculating abilities can 
use to guide their decisions about what to do, a criterion of rightness does not. A 
criterion of rightness need only specify the fundamental features of actions that 
determine whether they are right or wrong, and it may turn out that actual 
agents are often unable to discern whether their actions have these features. So, if 
TAC is meant to provide only a criterion of rightness, which it is, then it is no 
objection to it that it fails as an adequate decision-making procedure.  
At this point, the critics of TAC may wish to distinguish between objective 
rightness and subjective rightness. Subjectively right (i.e., required) actions are those 
that we can legitimately expect actual agents with limited knowledge and imperfect 
calculating abilities to perform if acting conscientiously and, thus, are the ones that 
we can rightfully blame them for failing to perform. Objectively right actions, by 
contrast, are those that we could legitimately expect only idealized agents with full 
knowledge and perfect calculating abilities to perform if acting conscientiously. 
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Having made this distinction, the critics of TAC can argue that the primary 
function of an ethical theory is to provide an account of rightness that can be used 
to guide our practical deliberations and to inform our assessments of blame and 
praise—that is, to provide an account of subjective rightness. And this, they argue, 
is something that TAC fails to do. To see why, consider the following example: 
 
Mine Shafts: A hundred miners are trapped underground in one of two 
mine shafts. Floodwaters are rising, and the miners are in danger of 
drowning. Carmine can close one of three floodgates. Depending both on 
which floodgate she closes and on which shaft the miners are in, the 
results will be one of the six possibilities given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
                                           The miners are in… 
                                                Shaft A                                             Shaft B 
                Gate 1 Carmine saves 100 lives Carmine saves zero lives 
Carmine closes…   Gate 2 Carmine saves zero lives Carmine saves 100 lives  
                    Gate 3 Carmine saves 90 lives Carmine saves 90 lives 
 
Carmine does not know which shaft the miners are in, but she knows all 
the above as well as the fact that, given her evidence, there is a 50 percent subjective 
chance that the miners are in Shaft A as well as a 50 percent subjective chance that 
the miners are in Shaft B. As a matter of fact, though, the miners are in Shaft 
A. Assume that Carmine is not in any way at fault for her imperfect epistemic 
position with regard to the location of the miners. And assume that everything else 
is equal and, thus, that the unforeseen remote effects of her actions would be the 
same regardless of which gate she closes and that Carmine knows this.6 
Carmine does not know whether it is closing Gate 1 or Gate 2 that would 
maximize the good, but she knows that there is no chance that closing Gate 3 
would maximize the good. In fact, we are told that the miners are in Shaft A, 
which means that it is closing Gate 1 that would maximize the good. Thus, 
according to TAC, Carmine is required to close Gate 1. But if we are talking about 
what Carmine is required to do in the subjective sense—the sense that is supposed 
to guide her practical deliberations and inform our assessments of blame and 
praise for her actions, then it is counterintuitive to suppose that Carmine is required 
to close Gate 1. Indeed, it seems that, in the subjective sense, Carmine should 
instead close Gate 3. Here, then, is a case in which it seems (subjectively) morally 
permissible for an agent to fail to maximize the good. And so here we have a 
genuine objection to TAC, assuming that the primary function of an ethical theory is 
to provide a criterion of subjective rightness. The objection would be that claim (I)—
the claim that it is never permissible to fail to maximize the good—is false, for 
Carmine should close Gate 3 even though her doing so would fail to maximize the 
good. 
To see why Carmine should, in the subjective sense, close Gate 3 and not 
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Gate 1, recall that Carmine has no idea whether it is closing Gate 1 or Gate 2 that 
would maximize the good. Thus, we should not expect Carmine, if morally 
conscientious, to close either one. Doing so would be too risky, carrying a 
substantial subjective risk of saving no one. In closing Gate 3, by contrast, she 
guarantees that 90 miners will be saved. And given the associated risk, we would 
blame Carmine if she closes Gate 1 even though this is what TAC implies that she 
was required to do. So, if we are looking for an account of rightness that can be 
used to guide our practical deliberations and inform our assessments of blame 
and praise, TAC is not it. 
There are at least two ways to respond to this objection. One is to deny that 
the primary function of an ethical theory is to guide our practical deliberations 
and inform our assessments of blame and praise. Perhaps, the primary function of 
ethical theory is instead to figure out what our objective ends should be (e.g., 
maximizing the good, acting virtuously, or abiding by the Categorical 
Imperative). This would leave it to decision theory or some other branch of 
practical philosophy to provide an account of how agents with limited knowledge 
should make practical decisions given both their normative uncertainty about 
what their objective ends should be and their nonnormative uncertainty about 
how best to achieve them.7 
Another way to respond to the above objection is to accept that the 
primary function of an ethical theory is to provide an account of subjective 
rightness and try to revise TAC so that it can serve this function. Some (e.g., 
Jackson 1991) have suggested that the way to do this is to adopt subjective 
consequentialism: 
 
SC (1.0) A subject’s performing x is (subjectively) morally permissible if 
and only if, and ultimately because, there is no available alternative, y, 
whose outcome ranks higher than x’s outcome, and (2.3) y’s outcome 
ranks higher than x’s outcome if and only if y’s outcome is better than 
x’s outcome in terms of expected value. 
 
A subject maximizes expected value if and only if they maximize ∑iPr(Oi/Aj) 
× V(Oi), where Pr is the subject’s probability function at the time, V is 
consequentialism’s value function, Oi are the possible outcomes, and Aj are the 
possible actions (Jackson 1991, 463–4). But even if SC gets the intuitively correct 
answer in Mine Shafts, it suffers from two significant problems. First, given agents’ 
limited knowledge and imperfect calculating abilities, they are hardly ever in the 
position to reliably figure out which of the countless alternatives available to them 
would have the highest expected value over an indefinite future (Feldman 2006). 
After all, the only reason that SC can be used in Mine Shafts to guide Carmine’s 
practical deliberations and to inform our assessments of blame and praise is 
because it was artificially stipulated that the unforeseen remote effects of 
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Carmine’s actions would be the same regardless of which gate she closes and that 
she knows this. So, although SC might be useful in a few artificial cases like Mine 
Shafts, it is not much of an improvement over TAC in providing action guidance. 
Second, SC seems suspect in that it allows for an agent’s nonnormative 
uncertainty, but not for her normative uncertainty, to affect the subjective rightness 
of her actions. Whereas SC allows that an agent’s uncertainty about which act will 
maximize the good affects the subjective rightness of her actions, it does not allow 
for her uncertainty as to whether she ought to be seeking to maximize the good to 
affect the subjective rightness of her actions. This is potentially problematic, for 
arguably an agent’s nonculpable uncertainty with regard to the relevant normative 
facts (e.g., whether her objective end should be to maximize the good or something 
else) is just as important in determining what we can legitimately expect her to do 
and to blame her for not doing as her nonculpable uncertainty with regard to the 
relevant nonnormative facts is (e.g., whether this or that act will best achieve the 
objective ends that she ought to be pursuing). And, because of this, SC seems to fall 
prey to a counterexample that is analogous to Mine Shafts, only in this example we 
swap normative uncertainty for nonnormative uncertainty. 
I will present the counterexample shortly, but first let me state my 
assumptions. First, I will assume that although impermissibility does not come in 
degrees, the moral badness of impermissible acts does. That is, some impermissible 
acts are morally worse than others. For instance, on TAC, any act that fails to 
maximize value is impermissible. But it is plausible to suppose that some acts that fail 
to maximize value are worse than others, as some fall further from the mark of 
maximal value than others do. Likewise, on Kantianism, any act that violates the 
Categorical Imperative is impermissible. But it is plausible to suppose that some 
violations of the Categorical Imperative are morally worse than others. For instance, it 
seems that violating the Categorical Imperative by killing someone with an otherwise 
bright future is much worse than violating the Categorical Imperative by telling a 
relatively harmless lie. Second, I will assume that we can measure the degree to which 
acts are morally good/bad in terms of their deontic value, where the deontic value of a 
supererogatory act is always positive, the deontic value of an impermissible act is 
always negative, and the deontic value of a non-supererogatory optional act is always 
zero. (Let ‘DV(x)’ stand for ‘the deontic value of x’.) Third, and more controversially, I 
will assume that we can make inter-theoretic comparisons of deontic value.8 Fourth 
and last, I will assume that TAC and Kantianism are accounts of objective rightness. 
Now, here is the counterexample to SC: 
 
Normative Uncertainty: Norma must choose among the following three 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive options: a1, a2, and a3. (To 
ensure that they are jointly exhaustive, let a3 be the act of doing 
something other than either a1 or a2.) If she does a1, she will maximize 
value (not deontic value, but nonmoral value)9 but violate the 
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Categorical Imperative. If she does a2, she will abide by the Categorical 
Imperative but fail to maximize value. And if she does a3, she will both 
fail to maximize value and violate the Categorical Imperative. 
Depending both on which theory of objective rightness is true and on 
which act she performs, the deontic value of her action will be one of the 
six possibilities given in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
                                      The true theory is . . . 
                                   TAC  Kantianism 
a1 DV(a1) = 0  DV(a1) = −100 
Norma performs…  a2 DV(a2) = −100 DV(a2) = 0 
a3 DV(a3) = −10 DV(a3) = −10 
 
Norma does not know whether TAC or Kantianism is true, but she 
knows all the above as well as the fact that, given her evidence, there is a 50 
percent subjective chance that TAC is true as well as a 50 percent subjective 
chance that Kantianism is true. Assume that Norma is not in any way at fault for 
her imperfect epistemic position with regard to which ethical theory is true. And 
note that since Norma knows that her performing a1 is what would maximize 
value, it follows that Norma’s performing a1 is also what would maximize 
expected value. 
Norma does not know whether it is performing a1 or a2 that is morally 
permissible, but she knows that there is no chance that performing a3 is morally 
permissible. Of course, since Norma knows, as stipulated, that her performing a1 
would maximize value, it follows that her performing a1 would maximize 
expected value (not expected deontic value, but expected nonmoral value). So, 
according to SC, Norma is required to perform a1. But if we are talking about 
what Norma is required to do in the subjective sense—the sense that is sup- 
posed to guide her practical deliberations and inform our assessments of blame 
and praise for her actions, then it is counterintuitive to suppose that Norma is 
required to perform a1. After all, given her ignorance of whether it is TAC or 
Kantianism that is true, we should expect Norma, if morally conscientious, to 
perform a3. For performing either a1 or a2 is just too risky. They both carry the 
substantial subjective risk of performing an act with a deontic value of −100, 
whereas if she performs a3, she can be certain that the deontic value of her act 
will be no worse than −10. Given the associated risk, we would blame Norma for 
performing a1 even though this is what SC implies that she is required to do. So, 
if we are looking for an account of rightness that can be used to guide our 
practical deliberations and inform our assessments of blame and praise, then SC 









As we saw above, TAC seems too demanding. Interestingly, it seems to be too 
permissive as well. On TAC, there are no types of acts that are off-limits, not even 
rape, murder, torture, or genocide. Of course, the TACist can hold that, say, murder 
is especially bad and, indeed, so bad as to make one murder worse than any 
number of deaths by natural causes. The TACist can, then, hold that it is 
impermissible to murder one person even to produce a vaccine that would save 
countless lives. Nevertheless, the TACist must still concede that it would be 
permissible to commit one murder to prevent two other comparable murders. 
Since no matter how bad murder is, two murders will, other things being equal, be 
worse than one murder, the TACist must concede that it will be permissible to 
commit murder to minimize the overall commissions of murder. Thus, on TAC, 
any type of act, no matter how intrinsically bad, will be permitted in those 
circumstances in which committing one instance of that act-type will minimize 
overall commissions of that act-type. 
This illustrates a more general problem with TAC: it is unable to 
accommodate agent-centered constraints. An agent-centered constraint is a constraint 
on maximizing the good that it would be wrong to infringe upon even in some 
circumstances in which doing so would minimize comparable infringements of that 
constraint.10 On commonsense morality, there are two types of agent-centered 
constraints: agent-centered restrictions and special obligations. Agent-centered 
restrictions prohibit agents from performing certain types of acts (e.g., murder) even in 
some circumstances in which doing so would minimize comparable commissions of 
that act-type. Special obligations, by contrast, require agents to do certain things (e.g., 
to keep their promises) even in some circumstances in which their failing to do so 
would minimize comparable failings of that type. These special obligations often arise 
as the result of performing certain past acts (e.g., making a promise) but also come 
with occupying certain roles (e.g., certain professional and familial roles). Since TAC 
is unable to accommodate these agent-centered constraints, it can seem too 
permissive. This is the permissiveness objection. 
If we give credence to the intuitions that ground the permissiveness 
objection, we might think that TAC must be abandoned for the sake of some 
version of consequentialism that can accommodate agent-centered constraints. 
One such version can be obtained by modifying SU, the result being: 
 
Mod-SU (1.0) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and 
only if, and ultimately because, there is no available alternative, y, 
whose outcome ranks higher than x’s outcome, and (2.4) y’s outcome 
 16 
ranks higher than x’s outcome if and only if there is no available 
alternative that would produce both more constraint-adjusted utility 
and more comprehensively-adjusted utility than x would, where the 
constraint-adjusted utility of an outcome is just the sum of the utility for 
others, adjusted by multiplying any disutility (or loss of utility) resulting 
from the subject’s infringement of an agent-centered constraint by 500, 
and where the comprehensively-adjusted utility of an outcome is just its 
constraint-adjusted utility added to the product of the subject’s utility 
times ten. 
 
In other words, Mod-SU holds that an act is morally permissible so long 
as there is no available alternative that produces both more constraint-adjusted 
utility and more comprehensively-adjusted utility. Like SU, Mod-SU allows 
agents to give their own utility anywhere from no weight at all to ten times the 
weight that everyone else’s utility has from the impersonal perspective. But, 
unlike SU, Mod-SU requires that agents give the disutility caused by their 
infringements of constraints 500 times the weight that this disutility has from the 
impersonal perspective. 
Mod-SU could easily accommodate a non-absolute constraint against, 
say, committing murder.11 Agents would, other things being equal, be prohibited 
from committing murder even to prevent up to 500 others from each committing 
some comparable murder. And Mod-SU could easily accommodate a non-
absolute constraint against failing to fulfill the special obligation that parents 
have to nurture their own children. Parents would, other things being equal, be 
prohibited from failing to nurture their own children even to prevent up to 500 
others from each comparably failing to nurture their children. Clearly, then, Mod-
SU can accommodate both agent-centered restrictions and special obligations. 
 
Infinite Goodness and the Strong Pareto Principle: 
 
TAC can also seem too permissive in cases in which all the alternatives open to an 
agent would produce an infinite amount of goodness. Suppose, for instance, that 
you have the choice either to do x or to refrain from doing x. If you do x, Wx will be 
the actual world. If you refrain from doing x, W~x will be the actual world.12 These 
two possible worlds are depicted in Table 4. Assume that the two worlds have the 
same locations of value (e.g., the same people or times) and that they have an 
infinite number of locations.13 Thus, the ellipses indicate that the 1’s should 







                           Wx                                          . . . , 1, 1, 1, 1, −8, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . . 
                            W~x                                           . . . , 1, 1, 1, 1, −2, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . . 
 
Intuitively, it seems wrong for you to do x. Yet if we think that one world can be 
better than another if and only if the total sum of goodness contained by the one is 
greater than the total sum of goodness contained by the other, then TAC implies that its 
permissible to do x. After all, the total sum of goodness contained by both Wx and W~x is 
infinity, and no total sum is greater than infinity. Thus, on the assumption that one world 
can be better than another if and only if the total sum of goodness contained by the one 
is greater than the total sum of goodness contained by the other, TAC counterintuitively 
implies that it is permissible for you do x, for W~x would, then, be no better than Wx. So, 
here is another case in which it seems impermissible to maximize the good, for, in this 
case, it seems impermissible to maximize the good by doing x. 
One way to defend TAC against this objection is to reject the assumption 
that one world can be better than another if and only if the total sum of goodness 
contained by the one is greater than the total sum of goodness contained by the 
other and to hold instead the strong pareto principle: if every location has at least 
as much goodness in Wi as it does in Wj, and at least one location has more 
goodness in Wi than it does in Wj, then Wi is better than Wj (Lauwers and Val- 
lentyne 2004). On this principle, W~x is better than Wx. Thus, when combined with 
the strong pareto principle, TAC gets the intuitively correct result, implying that it 
is impermissible for you to do x. 
Another response to the objection is to accept the assumption that one 
world can be better than another if and only if the total sum of goodness contained 
by the one is greater than the total sum of goodness contained by the other and so 
accept that we need to replace TAC with something along the lines of the following 
view, which I call rational-preference consequentialism: 
 
RPC (1.0) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and 
ultimately because, there is no available alternative, y, whose outcome ranks 
higher than x’s outcome, and (2.5) y’s outcome ranks higher than x’s outcome 
if and only if the subject has decisive reason, all things considered, to prefer 
y’s outcome to x’s outcome. 
 
RPC ranks alternative outcomes not in terms of their impersonal goodness, but in 
terms of the subject’s (agent-neutral and agent-relative) reasons to prefer each to 
the others. So, even if W~x is not, strictly speaking, better than Wx, you ought to 
prefer W~x to Wx. For the fact both that every location has at least as much 
goodness in W~x as it does in Wx and that at least one location has more goodness 
in W~x than it does in Wx would seem to constitute a decisive reason for you to 
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prefer W~x to Wx. Thus, RPC implies that it is impermissible for you to maximize 
the good by doing x. 
 
Third objection: It is not the case that if the subject’s 
performing x is morally permissible, it is ultimately because 
their performing x would maximize the good. 
 
One might accept that the subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and 
only if their performing x would maximize the good but deny that what makes 
their performing x morally permissible is that their doing so would maximize the 
good. Philippa Foot (1985), for instance, holds that it is the other way around: that 
what makes a subject’s performing x an act that would maximize the good is that 
it is a morally permissible act, for she argues that we have no grasp of the notion 
of a good state of affairs that is independent of what is required by the virtue of 
benevolence. And, on her view, benevolence is itself constrained by the other 
virtues; that is, benevolence comes into play only in choosing among actions that 
are not ruled out by the other virtues (such as, justice). Thus, it makes no sense to 
say that the state of affairs in which you commit one murder is better than the 
one in which five others each commit murder, for your committing murder, even 
to prevent five others from doing the same, is ruled out by justice. On Foot’s 
view, then, we can make sense of one state of affairs being better than another 
only if we see benevolence as requiring us to bring about the one as opposed to 
the other and, thus, see no other virtue as prohibiting us from doing so. And, 
therefore, we can have no grasp of one state of affairs being better than another 
that is independent of our understanding of whether it would be permissible for 
us to bring about the one as opposed to the other. 
Others, though, have questioned this view. For instance, Samuel Scheffler 
asks: “[D]o we really cease to understand what is meant by ‘a better state of 
affairs’ if the question is raised whether infringing a right or telling a lie or 
treating a particular individual unfairly might perhaps produce a better state of 
affairs than failing to do so?” (1985, 412). But even if we side with Scheffler on 
this point, we might think that some of the versions of consequentialism 
discussed above, such as Mod-SU and RPC, are particularly prone to this sort of 
Footian worry. On these consequentialist views, the outcomes of actions are not 
given an agent-neutral ranking in terms of their impersonal goodness, but are 
instead given an agent-relative ranking in terms of the agent’s reasons for 
preferring each outcome to its alternatives. And it may seem that the correct 
agent-relative ranking was settled based on our intuitions about what it is right 
and wrong to do. The worry, then, is that insofar “as an agent-relative ordering 
of all states of affairs from better to worse can be constructed only once we have 
figured out which actions are right, it cannot serve as a guide to rightness” (van 
Roojen 2004, 169). Thus, the Footian worry is that these more nuanced versions 
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of “consequentialism” avoid counterintuitive implications only at the cost of 
abandoning one of consequentialism’s core commitments: specifically, the 
commitment to the idea that the deontic statuses of actions are determined by 
how their outcomes rank, not vice versa.14 
 
Other Responses to These Objections 
 
I have suggested that one move that the TACist can make in response to an 
objection is to modify TAC so that it avoids the objection. Specifically, I have 
suggested modifying TAC by modifying the way it ranks outcomes—that is, by 
modifying (2.0) in the formulation of TAC given at the beginning of the section 
“Act-Utilitarianism and Traditional Act-Consequentialism.” This strategy is called 
consequentializing. The idea is to start with some plausible non-consequentialist 
theory that avoids the objection in question and take whatever features that it 
considers to be relevant to assessing the deontic statuses of actions and incorporate 
them as features that are relevant to how outcomes rank, thereby generating a 
consequentialist theory that avoids the objection.15 
There are, of course, other ways for the TACist to respond to an objection. 
One is to accept the general conciliatory approach of thinking that TAC must be 
modified to avoid the objection but to modify TAC by modifying its account of 
how its ranking of outcomes determines the deontic statuses of actions—that is, by 
modifying (1.0) as opposed to, or in addition to, modifying (2.0) in the above 
formulation of TAC. Another way for the TACist to respond to an objection is not 
at all conciliatory and involves trying to discredit the intuitions on which the 
objection is based. I explain both strategies below. 
 
Modifying (1.0) of TAC 
 
If one takes the intuitions behind the demandingness objection seriously, one 
might reject TAC and adopt satisficing consequentialism in its place: 
 
SAT (1.1) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, 
and ultimately because, x’s outcome ranks high enough relative to the 
best available alternative(s), and (2.6) x’s outcome ranks high enough 
relative to the best available alternative(s) if and only if the total amount 
of (impersonal) goodness contained in x’s outcome plus n (n > 0) is 
greater than or equal to the total amount of (impersonal) goodness 
contained within each of the best available alternatives.16 
 
SAT can accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. The 
problem, though, is that it permits agents to sacrifice their own good for the sake 
of making things worse for others (Bradley 2006). To illustrate, consider the case 
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depicted in Table 5. 
Let S = the subject, U(x) = the overall utility that would be produced if 
the subject does x, and let n = 80. Assume that a1 is the act of your keeping to 
yourself while you work to complete some important project for your job, that a2 
is the act of your instead dissuading six others from donating money to Oxfam, 
that a3 is the act of your instead dissuading seven others from donating money to 
Oxfam, and that a4 is the act of your instead dissuading eight others from 
donating money to Oxfam. Assume that your failure to complete the important 
project will cost you ten utiles. And assume that for each person that you dissuade 
from donating money to Oxfam there will be ten fewer utiles of aggregate utility. 
 
 Table 5  
 
x U(x) deontic status 
a1 +190 supererogatory and best 
a2 +120 supererogatory 
a3 +110 merely permissible 
a4 +100 impermissible 
 
SAT implies that it is permissible for you to neglect your work to 
dissuade seven others from donating their money to Oxfam, thereby making 
things worse not only for you, but also for others. What is worse, SAT implies 
that it is actually supererogatory for you to neglect your work to dissuade six 
others from donating their money to Oxfam, thereby making things worse not 
only for you, but also for others. The idea that making a personal sacrifice for 
the sake of making things worse for others can be permissible and even 
supererogatory is utterly absurd. 
Perhaps, then, the best solution to the demandingness objection is, not to 
adopt SAT, but to adopt scalar consequentialism: 
 
SCAL (1.2) A subject’s performing y is morally better than their 
performing x if and only if, and ultimately because, y’s outcome ranks 
higher than x’s outcome, and (2.0) y’s outcome ranks higher than x’s 
outcome if and only if y’s outcome is (impersonally) better than x’s 
outcome.17 
 
Since SCAL does not provide a criterion for assessing the permissibility of 
actions but provides only a criterion for assessing the comparative deontic value of 
alternative acts, SCAL avoids issuing any requirements (or permissions) at all. And 
by avoiding issuing any demands at all, it certainly avoids the demandingness 
objection. But it does so at the price of not even providing a criterion of rightness. 
Thus, SCAL succeeds in avoiding the demandingness objection only at the price of 
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failing to fulfill the function of an ethical theory, which is, it seems, to provide a 
criterion of rightness. 
If we think that this is indeed too high a price to pay, we could instead 
avoid the demandingness objection, and the permissiveness objection as well, by 
adopting rule-consequentialism: 
 
RC (1.3) A subject’s performing x is morally permissible if and only if, and 
ultimately because, x is permitted by the code of rules with the highest-
ranked associated outcome, and (2.7) the outcome associated with one 
code of rules ranks higher than the outcome associated with another code 
of rules if and only if the one is (impersonally) better than the other.18 
 
Not very long ago, the consensus was that RC is untenable, the thought being 
that it either collapses into practical equivalence with TAC or suffers from 
incoherence. Brad Hooker (2000) has been largely responsible for shattering this 
consensus. He has shown that if we formulate RC so that it ranks codes of rules in 
terms of the amount of good that would result from their gaining widespread 
acceptance as opposed to the amount of good that would result from their being 
universally complied with, RC will not collapse into practical equivalence with TAC. 
The thought was that RC will collapse into practical equivalence with 
TAC, because a rule that never permits failing to maximize the good (such as “Take 
care of your loved ones except when doing otherwise would maximize the good”) 
will always win out over one that sometimes permits failing to maximize the good 
(such as “Take care of your loved ones”), for the former type of rule would produce 
more good if universally complied with. So, when formulated in terms of 
compliance, RC collapses into practical equivalence with TAC. 
However, this does not happen when we formulate RC in terms of 
acceptance. For there are costs associated with getting each new generation to 
accept a given code of rules, and, thus, the ideal code of rules cannot be too 
complicated or too demanding or the costs of getting the rules inculcated will 
exceed the benefits of having them widely accepted. Consider, for instance, that 
the costs of getting a rule such as “Take care of your loved ones except when 
doing otherwise would maximize the good” to become widely accepted would 
be incredibly high given people’s natural inclination to favor their loved ones. 
Thus, when formulated in terms of acceptance, RC avoids the collapse objection 
by including rules that sometimes permit failing to maximize the good. 
However, the worry now is that if RC includes rules that sometimes permit 
failing to maximize the good, then RC must be guilty of incoherence. After all, it 
may seem that RC is ultimately committed to the maximization of the good, and 
it certainly seems incoherent to be committed to the maximization of the good 
while holding that it is sometimes permissible to fail to maximize the good. 
However, Hooker (2000) argues that RC is not committed to the maximization of 
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the good. The argument for RC is not that it is the theory that derives from some 
overarching commitment to the maximization of the good, but that it does a 
better job of meeting various desiderata (e.g., internal consistency, coherence 
with our considered moral convictions, etc.) than any other alternative moral 
theory does. 
 
The dismissive reply 
 
In the above, I have suggested several ways that we might modify TAC to avoid 
various objections. Most of these objections stem from certain commonsense 
intuitions about what it is right and wrong to do in particular cases. Some 
consequentialists have argued, though, that instead of modifying TAC in 
response to such objections, we should instead dismiss the intuitions on which 
these objections are based. The thought is that if TAC conflicts with our 
commonsense morality and the intuitions associated with it, then so much the 
worse for our commonsense morality. Recently, this sort of blusterous response has 
been given more substance via an appeal to the work of the psychologist Joshua D. 
Greene. Greene has conducted experiments using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging that purport to show that emotional neural processes tend to generate 
what he takes to be characteristically deontological judgments, whereas cognitive 
neural processes tend to generate what he takes to be characteristically 
consequentialist judgments. And Peter Singer (2005) and Greene (2003, 2008) 
have both argued that these empirical findings impugn the credibility of these 
characteristically deontological intuitions without impugning the credibility of 
these characteristically consequentialist intuitions. The empirical findings 
purport to show that the emotional processes that give rise to these 
characteristically deontological intuitions are tracking whether or not the relevant 
harm is up-close and personal. And they argue that since this is clearly a morally 
irrelevant factor, it follows that the emotional processes and the characteristically 
deontological intuitions that they give rise to should be deemed unreliable. Singer 
explains: 
 
If…our intuitive responses are due to differences in the emotional pull of situations that 
involve bringing about someone’s death in a close-up, personal way, and bringing about the 
same person’s death in a way that is at a distance, and less personal, why should we believe 
that there is anything that justifies these responses? …For most of our evolutionary history, 
…violence could only be inflicted in an up-close and personal way—by hitting, pushing, 
strangling, or using a stick or stone as a club. To deal with such situations, we have 
developed immediate, emotionally based responses to questions involving close, personal 
interactions with others. The thought of pushing the stranger off the footbridge elicits these 
emotionally based responses. Throwing a switch that diverts a train that will hit someone 
bears no resemblance to anything likely to have happened in circumstances in which we and 
our ancestors lived…. But what is the moral salience of the fact that I have killed someone in a 
way that was possible a million years ago, rather than in a way that became possible only two 
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hundred years ago? I would answer: none. (2005, 347–8)19 
 
Thus, Singer and Greene argue that there is good reason to question the reliability 
of our deontological intuitions: they are tracking what appear to be morally 
irrelevant factors. But there seems to be no equivalent reason for thinking that the 
consequentialist factors that our cognitive processes are tracking are likewise 
morally irrelevant. Indeed, they argue, unlike in the case of our characteristically 
deontological intuitions, we cannot give an evolutionary debunking of our 
characteristically consequentialist intuitions. And if all that is right, then perhaps 
we should reject the deontological intuitions on which the objections to TAC rest 
rather than reject TAC itself.20 
 
A Different Kind of Objection to Traditional Act-Consequentialism 
 
Thus far, we’ve considered objections to TAC’s three claims: (I) it is never permissible 
to fail to maximize the good, (II) it is always permissible to maximize the good, and 
(III) if a subject’s performing x is morally permissible, it is ultimately because their 
doing so would maximize the good. But some objections don’t take aim at these 
claims, but instead take aim at some overarching implication of the view. I’ll now 
consider three such overarching objections. 
 
First overarching objection: TAC implausibly 
implies that it can be indeterminate whether a 
subject has acted permissibly. 
 
Imagine that a sniper shoots and kills Gunnar as he is attempting to enter an 
elementary school with a gun. Did the sniper maximize the good in shooting Gunnar? 
Well, it depends on whether shooting Gunnar was necessary to protect others, which 
in turn depends on whether Gunnar would have hurt anyone had he not been shot. 
But it’s entirely possible that Gunnar had the kind of libertarian freedom that implies 
that there is just no fact of the matter as to what he would have done had he not been 
shot. And, in that case, it is indeterminate whether the sniper maximized the good. 
 Now, on TAC, whether the sniper acted permissibly in shooting Gunnar just 
depends on whether he maximized the good in doing so. So, if TAC implies that it’s 
indeterminate whether he maximized the good, then it also implies that it’s 
indeterminate whether he acted permissibly. And if it’s indeterminate whether the 
sniper acted permissibly, then it is indeterminate whether should blame him for what 
he did. What’s more, it’s indeterminate whether the sniper should act in the same 
way should he ever again face a relevantly similar situation. But if TAC can’t tell the 
sniper what he should do, nor tell us whether we should blame him for what he does, 
then we might wonder what’s the point of such a moral theory. What’s worse, it 
seems that whether the sniper acted permissibly just depends on factors such as what 
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the objective probability was that Gunnar would have hurt people had he not been 
shot and on how much hurt he would have then caused. But, instead, TAC implies 
that, regardless of such factors, it’s just indeterminate whether the sniper acted 
permissibly. And that seems implausible. 
 
Second overarching objection: TAC implausibly 
implies that permissibility doesn’t distribute over 
conjunction. 
 
Imagine that I would produce the most good if I were to raise both my arms, that a 
distant second best would be my raising neither arm, and that worst of all would be 
my raising only one arm. And let’s assume that I have all the following distinct 
options: raising both my left arm and my right arm, raising neither my left arm nor 
my right arm, raising my left arm, raising only my left arm, raising my right arm, and 
raising only my right arm. Lastly, assume that, because I’m a bad person who’s 
inclined to make things go as badly as possible, I would not raise my right arm if I 
were to raise my left arm. And, likewise, I would not raise my left arm if I were to 
raise my right arm. Note that the assumption here is not that I could not raise my left 
arm were I to raise my right arm, but rather that I would not raise my left arm were I 





Option   Produces    Ranking 
 
Raise my left arm  The least good   Worst 
Raise my right arm  The least good   Worst 
Raise only my left arm The least good   Worst 
Raise only my right arm The least good   Worst  
Raise both my arms  The most good   Best 
Raise neither of my arms Neither the most nor the least good  2nd Best 
 
The problem here is that, intuitively, permissibility distributes over conjunction. 
If I’m permitted to do x and y, then I’m permitted to do x (as well as permitted to 
do y). Yet, TAC denies this. For it implies both that it’s permissible for me to raise 
both my left arm and my right arm but that it’s impermissible for me to raise my 
left arm. It implies that I’m permitted to raise both my left arm and my right arm, 
because there is no alternative that would produce more good. But it implies that 
I’m not permitted to raise my left arm, for there is an alternative (namely, my 
raising neither arm) that would produce more good.21  
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Third overarching objection: TAC is implausibly 
collectively inefficacious. 
 
TAC seems to run into trouble when it comes to what we would expect a collection of 
agents to produce if they were all to act morally. To illustrate, let’s consider a case 
where there are just two individuals: Darcy and Dougal. Each has their own button in 
front of them, and each has exactly two options: push or don’t push. And let’s assume 
that neither can affect what the other will do but each knows what the other will do. 
And see Table 7 for the four possible outcomes. Now, imagine that both Darcy and 
Dougal are bad people who each wants both what’s best for themself and what’s 
worse for others. Consequently, both end up not pushing their buttons, and this 
results in an outcome with −10 units of goodness, which is an outcome that’s far 
worse than the best outcome that they could collectively achieve: the one where they 
both push and thereby produce an outcome with 8 units of goodness. Nevertheless, 
according to TAC, Darcy and Dougal both act permissibly. For they both did what 































 Nevertheless, many believe that the correct moral theory must be collectively 
efficacious such that the agents who abide by it, whoever and however numerous 
they may be, are guaranteed to produce the morally best world that they could 
collectively achieve. After all, morality is supposed to be a collective enterprise. So, 
we should be able to make things as morally good as possible if we all act morally. 
But TAC implies otherwise. For, according to TAC, Darcy and Dougal have done 
everything that TAC directs them to do even though they fall well short of bringing 





Historically, the debate over consequentialism has focused on TAC with 
consequentialists responding to objections either by abandoning TAC for some 
other more nuanced version of consequentialism or by attempting to discredit the 
intuitions on which the objections are based. Consequentialism has thus proved 
amazingly resilient to the onslaught of criticisms that have been leveled against it. 
Ultimately, though, whether consequentialism will rule the day depends on what 
the best version of it is and how this, the best version, compares to the best versions 
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1 Some might hold that there is sometimes, on commonsense morality, an option to act 
to make things worse both for oneself and for others. Whether this is plausible or not 
depends on whether there is, on commonsense morality, a pro tanto moral reason to 
promote the impersonal good, as Shelly Kagan (1991) has argued. (A pro tanto moral 
reason is one that has genuine weight such that it generates an obligation in the 
absence of countervailing reasons.) 
2 The third and fifth columns appear in boldface type, for these are the two columns 
that, on SU, are most salient to determining moral permissibility. 
3 I’m assuming that, although it wasn’t explicitly stated above, SU includes the 
following claim: a subject’s performing x is supererogatory if and only if, and 
ultimately because, there is a permissible alternative, y, whose outcome contains less 
utility for others (i.e., those other than the given subject) than x’s outcome. 
4 I would actually prefer to do away with condition (ii)–see Portmore (2011). That is, I 
prefer to let the term “supererogatory” denote the pre-theoretic notion of going above 
and beyond the call of duty (i.e., that of doing more than one has to), and an act can 
go above and beyond the call of duty without being commendatory, as where the 
agent performs such an act with a bad motive—see McNamara (2011). If we were to 
let the term “supererogatory” refer to the pre-theoretical notion of exceeding the 
minimum that morality demands, as I would prefer, we would be following 
McNamara (1996). Nevertheless, I include condition (ii) here, for many philosophers 
take it to be a necessary condition for an act’s being supererogatory. 
5 An act is optimific if and only if its outcome outranks that of every other available 
alternative. 
6 I borrow this example, with some minor revisions, from Derek Parfit (2011). 
7 Michael Smith (2006) defends such a view. 
8 See Sepielli (2009, 2010) for a defense of this controversial assumption as well as some 
suggestions about how this might be done. 
9 Whereas only acts can be morally good and bad and, thus, have deontic value, states 
of affairs (such as the state of affairs in which people experience more pleasure) can 
have nonmoral value—that is, value, simpliciter. The deontic value of an act is a 
measure of how much moral reason there is to perform that act. 
10 If there is a constraint against performing a certain act-type, then any commission of 
an act of that type constitutes an infringement of that constraint. But not all 
infringements of a constraint are wrong. All and only those infringements that are 
wrong constitute violations of that constraint. I follow Thomson (1990, 122) and 
Zimmerman (1996, 181) in making this terminological distinction. 
Constraints needn’t be absolute. It may be permissible to infringe upon a constraint 
if enough good is at stake, and it may be permissible to infringe upon a constraint if 
doing so would prevent a sufficient number of comparable infringements of that 
constraint. 
11 If we want Mod-SU to include an absolute constraint against committing murder, we 
need only replace “500” with “∞” in Mod-SU. 
12 I will assume that for each act alternative there is some determinate fact as to what the 
world would be like were she to perform that alternative. This assumption is some- 
times called counterfactual determinism—see, e.g., Bykvist (2003, 30). Although this 
assumption is controversial, nothing that I will say here hangs on it. I make the 
assumption only for the sake of simplifying the presentation. If counterfactual 
determinism is false, then instead of correlating each alternative with a unique 
possible world, we will need to correlate each alternative with a probability 
distribution over the set of possible worlds that might be actualized if S were to 
perform that alternative. I consider the possibility of such indeterminacy below. 
13 This example is borrowed with minor modifications from Kagan and Vallentyne 
(1997). 
14 For a response to this objection, see Portmore (2009a, 2011). 
15 See, for instance, Dreier (1993), Portmore (2009a, 2011), and Louise (2004). 
16 This is modeled on Ben Bradley’s formulation of comparative level satisficing 
consequentialism—see Bradley (2006, 101). 
17 For a defense of this view, see Norcross (2006). For a critique of this view, see Lawlor 
(2009a, 2009b) and Portmore (2011). 
18 What outcome is associated with a given code of rules will depend on how rule- 
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consequentialism is formulated. It may be the outcome that would result from 
universal compliance with it or from widespread acceptance of it or from something 
else. For a defense of rule-consequentialism, see Hooker (2000). For criticisms of rule- 
consequentialism, see Arneson (2005) and Portmore (2009b). 
19 Those unfamiliar with the cases involving switching the train (or trolley) from one 
track to another and pushing the fat man off the footbridge should see http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=Fs0E69krO_Q. 
20 For responses to these sorts of arguments by Greene and Singer, see Berker (2009) and 
Timmons (2008). 
21 For more on this issue, see Jackson (2014) and Portmore (2019).  
22 For more on this issue, see Regan (1980) and Portmore (2019). 
23 For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I thank Christian Miller. 
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